Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter? by Degryse, H.A.
TILEC Discussion Paper
TILECCompetition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?Competition on Financial Markets: 
Does Market Design Matter?*
Lecture
Delivered on the official acceptance of the office of the TILEC-AFM Chair 
on Financial Market Regulation at Tilburg University on January 19, 2007
By
Hans Degryse
CentER-Tilburg University and TILEC
* I would like to thank Jan Bouckaert, Frank de Jong, Jérémie Lefebvre, Steven Ongena, and 
Mark Van Achter for helpful comments on an earlier draft. Hans Degryse holds the TILEC-
AFM Chair on Financial Market Regulation, is a CESifo research fellow and is also affiliated 





*Ph.D (Katholieke Universiteit Leuven)
Mijnheer de Rector Magnificus,
Dames en heren,
I.    Introduction
The organizational structure of a financial market specifies the proce-
dures and rules that may lead to order flow and trades on its trading 
system. The industrial organization of financial markets, however, 
also determines how public and private information gets incorporated 
into prices, and how market participants strategically interact with 
each other. Ultimately, market design and market regulation shape 
the degree of investor participation, the competitiveness of financial 
markets, economic growth and social welfare. Therefore the question 
“Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?” 
deserves academic interest and insights from academic papers 
should be translated into policy and underpin policy decisions. On 
November 30, 2006, the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation in 
the US released its interim report showing that US financial markets 
have lost market share after a number of fraudulent cases as well as 
the introduction of the Sarbanes-Oxley Act. While in the past, many 
non-US companies raised capital or were listed in the US, lately, US 
markets have lost attractiveness in an international perspective. 
In this paper, we will focus on stock markets. but do not deal explicitly 
with the issue of competition for listings (see the Interim Report of 
the Committee on Capital Markets Regulation for a recent discus-
sion). 
The field that studies market design of financial markets is called 
“Market Microstructure”. Garman (976) was the first to introduce 
this terminology when writing his paper on market making and inven-
tory holding costs entitled “Market Microstructure”. Market micro-
structure deals with the economic forces behind trades, quotes and 
prices on markets in general and financial markets in particular. One 
of the main topics in the market-microstructure literature is to analyze
  For recent empirical work on bond markets see e.g. Bessembinder et al (200), or Biais, 
Declerck, Dow, Portes and von Thadden (2006).
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how the rules of the game can be designed such that the impact of 
market frictions is reduced. However, the design of markets may also 
determine the role of market frictions. But auction-academics will
immediately bring up: who cares? Don’t we have the revenue equiva-
lence theorem by Vickrey (96), later generalized by Myerson (98) 
and Riley and Samuelson (98), for which Vickrey by the way was 
awarded the Nobel Prize in 996? The review of some theoretical and 
empirical work below will illustrate that market design as well as 
regulation and supervision do play a role.
Nowadays investors face a bewildering menu of choices for executing
their trades. Stocks are not only cross-listed on several regular markets, 
but may also trade on new trading platforms. Particularly topical in 
Europe is the implementation of the Markets in Financial Instruments 
Directive (MiFID) that should take place by November 2007. This 
Directive seems to squeeze stock exchanges from two sides. 
Regulators call for further transparency concerning for example clear-
ing and settlement of trades, trading interests, and actual trades (see 
e.g. the Economist November 2006), but also the exchanges’ clients 
clamour for lower fees and threaten the exchanges with erecting 
new trading platforms (see the initiative of seven large investment 
banks to setup a new trading venue), as now allowed by MiFID in all 
European countries.
Understanding how intermarket competition works will therefore 
become more and more important, also in Europe. While the market-
microstructure literature has extensively dealt with single markets 
(more references can be found later on in this paper), the theoretical 
literature on intermarket competition where traders can trade simul-
taneously on several continuous markets is still limited. In this paper, 
we are not able to deal with all aspects of this exciting literature but 
we will stress one particular combination of markets, being crossing 
networks and dealer markets (given our own past research). However, 
we do not neglect the impact of other trading platforms on traditional 
markets. These insights from the theoretical and empirical academic 
literature are then employed to highlight some of the to-be-expected 
implications from MiFID. In particular, we deal with the issues of 7 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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fragmentation and investor protection, market access, and the role of 
transparency for the functioning of financial markets. 
Financial markets, together with banks, play a key role in the function-
ing of financial systems. In this paper, we do not aim to provide a 
complete overview of the conduct and regulation of financial systems 
and all the implications this may have on the economy (see e.g. Allen 
and Gale (2000) for “comparing financial systems”, or Degryse and 
Ongena (2004, 2006) for an analysis of the impact of technology and 
regulation in retail banking markets). While the role of banking regula-
tion is quite well understood, this is less the case for regulation and 
supervision of financial markets. This will be an area of research 
where the TILEC-AFM Research Network on Financial Market 
Regulation will be active. Along the way, we aim to point out some 
open issues that deserve further academic and policy attention.
The remainder of the paper is organized as follows. In Section II, we 
briefly discuss some typology of financial markets’ microstructure. 
Section III deals with the impact of intermarket competition. Section 
IV goes into issues related to Market Design and the expected impact 
of MiFID. Section V provides a policy discussion and concludes.
II.   Typology of Financial Markets
The objective of this Section is to discuss how different financial mar-
ket organizations can be classified. We describe first the typology of 
traditional financial markets. Afterwards we turn towards intermarket 
competition, where we deal extensively with the combination of cross-
ing networks and dealer markets.
II.1.   Typology of Traditional Financial Markets
The market-microstructure literature has typically divided traditional 
financial markets into dealer markets, auction markets, and hybrid 
markets (for a review of the market-microstructure literature, see 
O’Hara (99), Spulber (999), Madhavan (2000), Harris (2002), Biais, 
Glosten and Spatt (200), or De Jong and Rindi (forthcoming)). A 
dealer market is also called “quote driven” as the designated liquidity 
suppliers or market makers are the only providers of liquidity and 
the trades are based on the prevailing quotes in the markets. Market 8 Tilburg University
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makers or dealers are counterparty in all transactions and quote two 
prices: the bid price, at which they are willing to buy securities and the 
ask price, at which they will sell. The difference between those two 
prices is the market maker’s spread. This spread hinges on the degree 
of asymmetric information between the dealer and informed traders, 
inventory costs and the remuneration for the service of providing 
immediacy (see Glosten and Milgrom (98), Ho and Stoll (98) and 
Demsetz (968), respectively). Sometimes it is possible to negotiate 
better prices than those quoted by dealers (see e.g. Degryse (999)). 
Motivations for these better prices than those displayed on the 
screens stem for example from a long-lasting relationship between 
dealer and investor (Desgranges and Foucault (200)), or quantity 
discounts. Examples of dealer markets are Nasdaq, and some 
segments of the London Stock Exchange. 
Auction markets or order driven markets are driven by orders, as the 
prices at which trades occur are determined by the orders’ arrival to 
the financial market. On order driven markets, investors trade directly 
with each other or with the intervention of a broker dealer acting as 
an agency trader only. All unexecuted orders are gathered in a limit 
order book. Market orders consume liquidity. Limit orders that do 
not execute immediately, supply liquidity and could therefore be seen 
as free (short-lived) options against which market orders can be exe-
cuted. Examples of auction markets are Euronext, the Toronto Stock 
Exchange, but when taking a broader view, may also include the ECNs 
(electronic communication networks), we will discuss later in the 
paper. Within order driven markets, we can distinguish between call 
markets and continuous markets. In call markets, orders are entered 
into the trading system until the batch auction takes place. Batch auc-
tions are typically employed at the opening. A number of European 
markets have also introduced batch auctions to close the market (for 
more details see De Jong and Rindi (forthcoming)). In continuous 
auction markets, trades can take place at any time during the trading 
day provided that limit orders are available in the limit order book.   
Hybrid markets are markets where different elements from quote and 
order driven markets are combined. Markets are called hybrid markets 9 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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for two reasons. The first is that players or the design of a particularly 
organized segment of the market exhibit characteristics that stem 
from another market organization. For example, the specialist on the 
NYSE has the obligation to make the market and to provide liquidity 
by trading on own account, but this market is organized as a continu-
ous auction market. Second, an entire market is called hybrid when it 
offers simultaneously an auction and order driven segment. For exam-
ple, the London Stock Exchange offers a variety of market organiza-
tions like SETS (a continuous auction market), and SEAQ (a dealer 
market).
II.2.   Alternative trading systems2
Next to traditional markets, there is a wide variety in alternative 
trading systems (ATS). In referring to ATS we exclude the established 
market places such as the traditional exchanges. A typical aspect 
of ATS concerns the fact that buyers and sellers meet on an agency 
basis, i.e. there are no market makers that commit capital or that 
commit to provide liquidity. Within the ATS, we distinguish three 
groups of networks for which we will present a brief description of 
their typical features. 
A first important category is Electronic Communication Networks 
(ECNs). Weston (2002) describes ECNs as “electronic trading systems 
that allow investors to clear trades through an open limit order book. 
Rather than place orders with a specialist or dealer, traders on ECNs 
may anonymously submit orders and trade with each other directly.” 
ECNs allow traders to submit priced trades, i.e. limit orders. 
Therefore, ECNs have the potential to contribute to price discovery. 
Most ECNs guarantee pre- and post-trade anonymity. Examples of 
ECNs are Island, Instinet, Archipelago, and Redibook.
A second category of ATS are Crossing Networks (CNs). The SEC (2000) 
defines crossing networks as “systems that cross multiple orders at 
a single price and that do not allow orders to be crossed or executed 
outside of the specified times”. Crossing networks or crossing systems
2   This part is mainly based upon Degryse and Van Achter (2002).0 Tilburg University
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thus only trade at scheduled times, as opposed to the continuous 
trading of exchanges or other ATS. Since traders enter unpriced buy or 
sell orders, crossing systems do not contribute to price discovery. 
Execution risk remains at crossing-networks since the trade is not 
executed in the absence of counterparties. In this case there is excess 
demand or supply. The advantage of a crossing network is that it min-
imizes market impact. Trades are typically executed at the midpoint 
of the bid-offer spread in the base market. According to Salomon 
Smith Barney (200), crossing networks cater to institutional investors 
placing larger-sized orders in less liquid securities. Examples of cross-
ing networks for Europe include ITG’s POSIT or E-Crossnet (which 
was absorbed by ITG POSIT in February 200). In November 2006, 
Nasdaq planned to start a crossing system called Nasdaq Crossing 
Network (see Table 2 for more details). Crossing Networks aim to 
maximize the matched volume on their system. In contrast to auction 
markets, CNs cannot change the price to obtain equilibrium. The price 
at which trades happen is not determined in the Crossing Network 
but stems from the main market.3 
CNs originated in the early 970s as private phone-based networks in 
between buyside traders. Later on, in the 980s, they went electronic 
with the introduction of Instinet and POSIT (Plexusgroup (2004)) Next 
to the differences with regular trading systems presented in Table , 
individual CNs may also diverge one from another. Each CN uses a 
proprietary algorithm to match buy and sell orders. These specific 
rules are often opaque. All CNs aim at maximizing trading volume or 
the value of matched orders. For example, Xetra XXL, a crossing net-
work for block trades at Deutsche Börse, implements a volume/time 
priority rule. An overview of the sponsor, allocation rules and crossing 
prices of a number of major CNs can be found in Table 2. Note that 
the main organizers of CNs can be both “traditional” exchanges (e.g. 
NYSE, Xetra) as well as private institutions (e.g. ITG, Barclays).
3   While de Jong and Rindi (2007) include crossing networks in their typology of auction 
  markets, we exclude crossing networks from auction markets, as we view crossing 
networks as systems that free-ride on other markets for their price formation and that 
therefore cannot be separately categorized as auction markets. Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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Table 1. Trading Systems: Overview
  NYSE  Euronext   ECNs  Crossing   FOREX 
              Network 
Continuous    X    X    X        X  
Floor-based    X           
Limit order book    X    X    X       
Dealer    X                X  
Pre-trade prices    X    X    X       
Post-Trade Information    X    X    X     
Note: This table provides the main characteristics of the different 
markets. Euronext may have a specialist for very small stocks to 
guarantee liquidity. This is, however, a decision at the discretion of the 
listed firm. FOREX markets have indicative pre-trade prices but these are 
not binding, in contrast to a specialist’s quotes on the NYSE. Crossing 
Networks have a book in which orders are stored, but this book only 
contains orders specifying a quantity and not a price in contrast to limit 
orders in a limit order book. Most ECNs guarantee pre- and post-trade 
anonymity, but may deliver pre-trade prices and post-trade information 
on executed order sizes and prices.2 Tilburg University
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Table 2. Crossing Networks: Overview
Crossing Network Sponsor Allocation Rule Crossing Price
POSIT ITG Pro rata Average of bid and 
ask price, taken 
at a random time 
within 7 minutes 
after the cross
Instinet Last Daily 
Cross
Instinet Minimum quantity 
to all orders, 
remainders pro rata 
Closing price for 
exchange-listed 
stocks, average 
closing bid and ask 




Instinet Pro Rata  Spread midpoint
After Hours Trading 
Session
NYSE Precedence based 
on order type and 
time precedence 





Pro rata  Closing price main 
market






ties (typically the 
current average of 
bid and ask price)







Nasdaq Pro rata Spread midpoint
Note: This table presents an overview of the sponsors, allocation rules and cross-
ing prices of some major crossing networks.3 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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An important aspect of the design of CNs is handling the risk associ-
ated with manipulation of price discovery in the base market in order 
to obtain a better price at the CN. For example, right before the CN 
aims to cross buyers and sellers, investors might be buying in the 
base market in order to raise the midpoint price used to sell their 
standing orders in the CN. This risk is greater the less liquid the base 
market is and the larger the overall percentage of volume in the CN. 
CNs’ institutional design, however, has been adapted to dampen this 
risk: they typically select the midprice at a random time within a - or 
7-minute interval immediately following the scheduled cross time.4
A third type of ATS applies Smart order routing technology (SORT). 
These are systems developed by a variety of market participants that 
are used to route orders to centralized markets based on trading cri-
teria that seek to provide best execution for the client. This execution 
can be on a traditional exchange, on an electronic communication 
network, or both. The trading criteria can be price improvement or 
execution speed (see Foucault and Menkveld (2006) for implications 
of SORT with application to Euronext Amsterdam and EuroSETS). 
Smart order routing technology can only work when traders have 
(non-discriminatory) access to all markets, an issue we turn to when 
discussing the Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID).
III.   Intermarket Competition: Theory
The analysis of competition within a particular market design received 
considerable attention. Issues of market design such as transparency, 
tick size, call versus continuous markets, who should supply liquidity, 
all shape the competitiveness of markets. We refer the interested 
reader to e.g. Biais, Glosten and Spatt (200) for an overview of these 
issues.
As financial securities may trade simultaneously on one or several 
traditional markets and on ATSs, a trader has to decide how to 
allocate her orders across the different trading venues. As a result, all
4  Note that the risk remains, especially with respect to broker agreements to transact at a 
closing price for index funds.4 Tilburg University
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these trading venues compete for order flow. The question then is 
how intermarket competition affects market quality. The analysis of 
intermarket competition is related to the literature on the competition 
between traditional financial markets (see e.g. Pagano (989), Chowdry 
and Nanda (99), Glosten (994), Easley, Kiefer and O’Hara (996), 
Bessembinder and Kaufman (997), or Parlour and Seppi (2003)). 
III.1.   Costs and benefits of market fragmentation
Pagano (989), Chowdry and Nanda (99), and Admati and Pfleiderer 
(99) argue that due to liquidity externalities, trading has a natural 
tendency to concentrate on the market that is already most liquid. 
Therefore, it is difficult to “move liquidity” from one trading system 
to another even when the new trading system is intrinsically better. 
This finding is similar to the one in the network effects literature, 
where markets can be stuck in the “wrong” equilibrium due to net-
work effects. The “trade-through rule” in the US implies that orders 
for listed companies should be executed at the best price – imply-
ing that SORT is enforced by law. A trade-through happens when an 
order executes on a market despite there is a better price available 
on another market. The NYSE, enjoying a liquidity externality, there-
fore, did not face much competition as all orders are forced to go 
to the most liquid exchange (Regulation NMS in 994 in the US has 
imposed this trade-through rule for all automated quotations that can 
be automatically accessed). The literature that shows that consolidat-
ed markets should arise in equilibrium argues that there are costs to 
fragmentation. With fragmentation, bid-ask spreads tend to widen and 
exhibit greater price volatility (Harris (993)). However, heterogeneity 
in investor’s tastes (e.g. willingness to trade, degree of immediacy, 
portfolio composition effects, informed versus liquidity traders) sug-
gests that order flow may not be homogeneous. Then, some traders 
may search for differently organized trading systems that better sat-
isfy their needs, leading to fragmentation (see e.g. Madhavan (99)). 
Also, cream skimming may take place in that one market attracts the 
“uninformed” order flow. In this event, limit orders on the main 
market face more adverse selection problems and spreads may widen.
A potential benefit of increasing competition is that market quality may  Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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increase, for example, because bid-ask spreads become narrower. 
Beneficial effects occur when liquidity suppliers on the “incumbent” 
exchange enjoy market power. Then, the introduction of an additional 
market introduces competitive pressures on the incumbent exchange. 
Also, while the depth on the main market may decrease, the joint 
depth of both markets may increase (Glosten (998)).  
III.2.   Intermarket Competition: Crossing Networks and  
    Dealer Markets
The specific nature of CNs introduces some important differences: 
CNs do not actively contribute to price discovery, nor do orders have 
a price impact. To our knowledge, the specificities of the competition 
between a CN and a traditional market are investigated in three 
studies only. It was first analyzed in a static context in the seminal 
paper by Hendershott and Mendelson (2000). Dönges and 
Heinemann (2004) extend this analysis. A dynamic model, which 
allows for analyzing order submission patterns over time, is presented 
in Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2006).
III.2.1.   Static models
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) model the liquidity-based inter-
market competition between a CN and a Dealer Market (DM). Their 
aim is to investigate the trade-off between the benefits of increas-
ing competition between markets and the potential costs of order 
flow fragmentation due to the introduction of CNs. They show that 
the effects of CNs on market performance are subtle and complex. 
In their model, a random number of informed and liquidity traders 
simultaneously decide to submit single-unit orders to one market. 
This choice depends on trader specific characteristics, such as their 
valuation of the stock and their impatience to trade, as well as on 
market parameters (submission and execution costs at the CN, dealer’s 
half spread, CN’s probability of execution). Each trader determines her 
best response given her expectation of all other traders’ strategies. 
Hendershott and Mendelson (2000) discuss four possible strategies: 
(i) not trading, (ii) exclusive CN trading, (iii) exclusive DM trading
 
   This Section is mainly based on Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2007).6 Tilburg University
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and (iv) opportunistic CN trading. The latter reflects the possibility to 
relay orders to the DM upon non-execution at the CN.
Hendershott and Mendelson show that different trading venues may 
coexist. This happens when the population of traders is heterogene-
ous, for instance in the degree of impatience. Each market caters to 
the specific needs of particular classes of investors resulting in order 
flow fragmentation. DMs are influenced in two opposite ways by 
competition from the CN. On the one hand, there is risk sharing as 
dealers’ inventory and adverse selection costs are lowered by exclusive 
CN traders, resulting in narrower spreads. On the other hand, oppor-
tunistic CN trading (i.e. using the DM as “market of last resort”) may 
widen the DM-spread. The reasoning is that, in this case, the CN is 
skimming off part of the uninformed traders. Consequently, this frac-
tion of uninformed traders cannot be “used” anymore by dealers to 
compensate their losses to informed traders. Within the CN, also two 
opposite forces are at work. First, a positive liquidity externality, as 
an increase in CN trading volume benefits all CN traders and attracts 
additional liquidity. Second, when the CN becomes sufficiently liquid, 
this liquidity externality may be dominated by a negative crowding 
externality: low-liquidity preference traders compete with the higher-
liquidity value traders on the same market side. Combined with the 
competition effect, the resulting overall impact remains ambiguous. 
The emergence of the additional CN trading venue benefits some 
traders, while harming others.
Expanding on this paper, Dönges and Heinemann (2004) focus on 
some game theoretic refinements to reduce the multiplicity of equi-
libria in the coordination game. In particular, they model intermarket 
competition between a DM and a CN as a coordination game among 
traders and investigate under which circumstances these markets can 
coexist. If the disutility from unexecuted orders sufficiently differs 
across individuals, both markets coexist and order flow is fragmented. 
Market shares are determined by the distribution of disutilities.
III.2.2. Dynamic model of CN-DM interaction
In Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2006), we investigate the interac-7 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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tion of a CN and a continuous (one-tick) DM. More specifically, we 
analyze the impact on the composition and dynamics of the order 
flow on both systems. We contribute to previous work on CNs by 
explicitly introducing dynamics into the analysis. These dynamics are 
important: a typical characteristic of a CN is that it “matches” orders 
at a specified time during the trading day, while the other market 
simultaneously operates in a continuous fashion. We develop the 
analysis for three different informational settings: (i) transparency, (ii) 
complete opaqueness, and (iii) partial opaqueness. The benchmark 
transparency case reflects that traders are fully informed about past 
order flow and hence observe the prevailing state of the CN’s order 
book before determining their strategy. This results in pre- and post-
trade transparency. However, in reality CNs are rather opaque. We 
incorporate this by analyzing two different degrees of opaqueness: 
partial and complete. While partial opaqueness implies that traders 
observe previous trades at the DM but not submissions to the CN, 
complete opaqueness entails that traders are uninformed on both 
past CN and DM order flow.
The general setup of our model is as follows. Traders are assumed 
to arrive randomly and sequentially. Upon her arrival, a trader knows 
whether she is a buyer or a seller, observes the bid and ask price of 
the dealer, the state of the CN’s order book, and her willingness to 
trade. Moreover, she knows the time remaining to the cross, the dis-
tribution of buyers and sellers and the distribution of their willingness 
to trade. Trading in the DM implies a one-tick spread. Trading at the 
CN implies trading at the midprice, derived from the DM (so CNs 
do not actively contribute to price discovery). The cross takes place 
at the end of the trading day. When both trading systems coexist, 
traders can obtain guaranteed and immediate execution in the DM. 
They can also opt for cheaper (since they save the half spread), but 
later and (possibly) uncertain execution on the CN. Order flow to the 
CN is gathered in an order book where time priority is assumed. The 
implication is that at the cross, the orders that are submitted last at 
the excess market side do not obtain execution. Execution is then only 
certain when upon arrival, a trader is able to join the strictly shorter 
queue. In all other cases, the execution probability is lower than one. 8 Tilburg University
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Finally, a trader can also refrain from trading. We assume opportunis-
tic CN trading to be very costly and therefore it cannot be an equilib-
rium strategy. Investors trade at most one unit.
We explicitly introduce dynamics into the analysis, as most markets 
nowadays operate in a continuous fashion. In particular, we model 
how a trader’s decision hinges on the state of the CN’s order book 
(when transparent) and her expectation on the behavior of future 
traders until the cross determines her submission strategy. Important 
to note is that these strategies are time dependent and non-stationary. 
The number of periods left until the time of the cross is one impor-
tant aspect. The crucial element in the choice between a CN order 
and a DM trade, though, is the execution probability at the CN, since 
this determines expected profits. When an arriving trader submits a 
CN order, she changes the imbalance in the CN. This affects the exe-
cution probabilities of future CN orders and hence also the strategies 
chosen by future traders. When determining her optimal strategy, she 
must take these effects of her order into account. 
Our findings can be summarized as follows. First, in common to the 
three informational settings, we find that an increase in the DM’s rela-
tive spread augments the CN’s order flow. Therefore, we expect that 
CNs will be more successful in markets where spreads are substantial. 
At the same time price discovery should be sufficiently informative 
as the CN “free rides” on information about prices from the DM. 
Second, a CN and a DM cater to different types of traders. Investors 
with a high willingness to trade are more likely to opt for immediacy 
and prefer to trade at a DM. The existence of a CN results in “order 
creation”: investors with a low willingness to trade submit orders to a 
CN whereas they would never trade at a DM. Third, we also show that 
the execution probability at a CN is endogenous. It depends on the 
state of the CN’s order book (if transparent), the observed order flow, 
and the expectations for past and future orders. Hence, although we 
start from dealers willing to provide liquidity at exogenously given bid 
and ask prices, we partly endogenize liquidity supply and demand by 
looking at traders submitting orders for potential execution at a CN. 
Fourth, the transparency and partial opaqueness settings produce 9 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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systematic patterns in order flow. In particular, for the transparency 
case, we find that the probability of observing a CN order at the same 
side of the market is smaller after such an order than if it was not. 
Also, the probability of observing a sell at the DM decreases and the 
probability of a buyer trading on the DM increases when the previous 
order was a CN buy. Fifth, our results highlight that it is important 
to take into account the interaction between trading systems when 
measuring “normal” order flow. For example, when looking at an 
individual trading system, some order or trade flow sequences could 
wrongly be interpreted as being driven by information events, whereas 
they are caused by the interaction of trading systems.
IV.    Market Design: What to expect from MiFID based  
    on US and EU experience?
On April 2, 2004, the European Parliament and Council adopted the 
Markets in Financial Instruments Directive (MiFID), which is expected 
to be implemented in all EU-Member countries by November 2007. 
The objective of MiFID is to foster a fair, competitive, transparent, 
efficient and integrated European financial market, by providing a 
regulatory environment that (i) offers high quality investor protec-
tion and (ii) allows for the creation of new markets and services. The 
MiFID (as well as its US-counterpart Reg NMS 6) intend to create a 
fair level playing field between the different types of trading platforms. 
The regulatory process of MiFID follows the Lamfalussy process 
that distinguishes four successive “levels” of implementation. MiFID 
itself is the so-called “Level ”, providing the legislative framework. 
“Level 2” provides the implementing measures and details how the 
MiFID will work in practice. The Committee of European Securities 
Regulators (CESR) plays an important role in the entire process. For 
example, CESR assists in “level 3” by translating the first two levels
6  Reg NMS should come into effect somewhere during the last quarter of 2006. RegNMS 
divides trading venues in so-called “fast markets” and “slow markets”. The “trade-
through rule”(i.e. the Order Protection Rule) only applies for fast markets., i.e. an order 
can be executed on a fast market even though a better price was available on a slow 
market. Gomber and Gsell (2007) argue that this gives incentives for slow markets to 
change into fast markets. For an analysis of Reg NMS, see Gentzoglanis (2007).  20 Tilburg University
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 into national law and keeping an eye on harmonisation. Finally, “level 
4” supervises the consistent application of these laws (more details in 
Gomber and Gsell (2007)).
The MiFID is part of the Financial Services Action Plan (FSAP) and 
“replaces” the 993 Investment Services Directive (ISD). Under the 
ISD, countries were allowed to have the so-called “concentration rule” 
(Art 4(3) of the 993 ISD) implying that retail orders had to be exe-
cuted on a “regulated market”, limiting competition for the existing 
exchanges. Davies, Dufour and Scott-Quinn (200) review the trading 
systems in five big European countries and look at the implications 
of MiFID. They show that the development of financial markets in 
France, Spain and Italy is heavily influenced by the concentration rule. 
The concentration rule does not apply anymore in the Netherlands 
since October 200, but trading in Dutch stocks mainly occurred 
on Euronext Amsterdam; remind however initiatives like SEAQ 
International and EuroSETS in London that aimed to actively trade 
Dutch securities. In the absence of the concentration rule, trades can 
be executed on any trading platform such as the previously discussed 
alternative trading systems or internalisers – systems where financial 
institutions execute orders on a proprietary trading platform (and 
possibly against own inventory). Other countries like Germany have 
a “default rule” which requires financial intermediaries to execute 
orders on an exchange unless an investor opts-out (see Gomber and 
Gsell (2007)). This again gives an advantage to the incumbent market.
The existence of multiple trading venues clearly provides the investor 
a choice where to execute its trades. Some investors prefer one 
trading venue to another, as trading venues offer different characteris-
tics, and therefore cater to different types of traders. As argued above, 
some theories suggest that competition between trading venues may 
be harsher than competition within a particular trading venue. In this 
event, the coexistence of multiple trading venues may be beneficial to 
investors. However, when different trading venues coexist, markets 
become fragmented and investors have lower incentives to submit 
orders as the probability that their orders are executed is lowered. 
This is the consolidation-fragmentation discussion as introduced by 2 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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Hamilton (979) (see e.g. Stoll (200) for an application to the US-
markets). 
The MiFID aims to establish a comprehensive regulatory regime 
governing the execution of transactions in financial instruments 
irrespective of the trading methods used to conclude those trans-
actions so as to (i) ensure a high quality of execution of investor 
transactions and (ii) uphold the integrity and overall efficiency of 
the financial system. The MiFID allows that regulated markets and 
other alternative market centers compete for order flow. The Directive 
distinguishes three categories of trading services. The first two, 
“Regulated Markets” and “Multilateral Trading Facilities”, are “multi-
lateral systems operated and/or managed by a market operator, which 
brings together or facilitates the bringing together of multiple third-
party buying and selling interests in financial instruments…” (op. cit. 
Official Journal of the European Union L24/0). A regulated market, 
moreover, has clear and transparent rules regarding the admission 
of financial instruments to trading. The third system is a “systematic 
internaliser”. This is an “investment firm, which on an organised, fre-
quent and systematic basis deals on own account by executing client 
orders outside a regulated market or multilateral trading facility”. How 
do those three types of market centers fit into our typology discussed 
in Section II? The three types of market centers can be auction mar-
kets, dealership markets or hybrid markets. Typically, we put the mul-
tilateral trading facilities and systematic internalisers with the alterna-
tive trading systems, as these are “entrants” that threaten the position 
of the “incumbent” regulated markets.
The MiFID is concerned with three issues: investor protection, market 
access and transparency. We first review the existing academic empiri-
cal literature on each of these issues. In the next Section, we formu-
late our expectation about MiFID.22 Tilburg University
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IV.1.   Investor protection: market fragmentation and the  
    impact on market quality? 7
When trading is concentrated, and given adequate trading rules, 
regulators need to worry less about investor protection, at least in 
the short run. More attention towards investor protection is required 
when allowing for market fragmentation. MiFID indeed mandates the
adoption by investment firms of adequate procedures for conducting
their business, also related to potential conflicts of interest. The above 
discussion about theoretical contributions on intermarket competition
has identified potential costs and benefits of market fragmentation. 
What can we learn from previous empirical studies in the US and 
Europe?
IV.1.1   Electronic Communication Networks and 
    traditional markets
Most ECNs started operating in the late nineties after the introduction 
of the “Order Handling Rules” in 997 (Sussman (200b)). They have 
jointly attracted about 42% of market share in Nasdaq securities, and 
3% in NYSE listed stocks (2004 numbers; see Stoll (200)). According 
to Weston (2000), two causes can be discerned for this growth pat-
tern. First, the changing SEC regulations are an important determinant. 
For instance the order handling rules increased competition because 
public limit orders were since then allowed to compete directly with 
Nasdaq market makers. Also market makers posting orders on ECNs 
were since then obligated to make those orders available for the pub-
lic as well. This forced dealers to provide greater access to ECNs for 
investors. Moreover, ECNs have been more successful in attracting 
trade from Nasdaq. The intuition is that ECNs allows investors to 
trade directly with each other, eliminating the spread charged by deal-
ers. The NYSE is already an auction market (with a specialist) and 
enjoys an incumbency advantage due to the liquidity externality, and 
the prevailing “trade-through provision”. Secondly, the advances in 
technology have played a tremendous role. The US-based trading sys-
tems were less advanced compared to many European exchanges. 
7   This is partly based on Degryse and Van Achter (2002) and Degryse, Van Achter and 
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This allows the ECNs to attract a significant part of the market.
There are already some studies describing the behavior of ECNs and 
their impact on the market quality on traditional exchanges for the 
US. These include the following: Huang (2002), Hendershott and 
Mendelson (2000), Simaan, Weaver and Whitcomb (2003), Domowitz 
(200), Barclay, Hendershott and McCormick (2003), Weston (2000), 
Conrad, Johnson, and Wahal (2003), Benhamou and Serval (2000), 
Domowitz, Glen and Madhavan (200), Domowitz and Steil (999) 
and Naes and Ødegaard (2006). In most of these studies, the tradi-
tional market under consideration is Nasdaq as ECNs have proven to 
perform best for securities traded on this exchange (see below). We 
now briefly describe and compare the main results of some of these 
studies for four aspects of market quality, namely bid-ask spreads, 
depth of the market, informational efficiency and price discovery.8
Weston (2002) investigates whether the increased market share of 
ECNs leads to tighter bid-ask spreads (monthly average quoted, effec-
tive and relative spreads for stock i in month t), i.e. whether ECNs 
have a significant negative impact on spreads on traditional markets. 
For this purpose, he performs the following regression using a long 
time-series and large sample of firms9 :
In (Spread)it = ai + b (ECN Market share)it + b2 In(Reforms)it + b3 In(Size)it
+b4In(Turnover)it + b In(Volatility)it + b6(numberoftrades)it + e it
The variable “ECN market share” allows to test for the effect of ECN 
activity on spreads. The variable “Reforms” is included to capture 
possible spread effects of any market reforms (i.e. Order Handling 
Rules). The independent (control) variables in this model were chosen 
according to Wahal (997). They are used to capture well-known deter-
minants of bid-ask spreads, and of execution costs in general.
For instance, the selected size variable controls for the fact that orders 
that are large relative to normal trading volume are likely to have higher 
8  See Degryse et al (200) for an analysis of resiliency of a limit order market.
9  This is a multivariate fixed-effect model that allows for within-firm variation in the 
parameters to account for unobserved heterogeneity in liquidity for the sample of firms.
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execution costs because of adverse selection effects. Log transforma-
tions of these variables are used to reduce the skewness.
The b- coefficient is of interest to us. It is consistently negative and 
statistically and economically significant for all specifications (i.e. for 
the three kinds of spreads). This implies that ECNs are in fact effec-
tive low-cost competitors to the traditional Nasdaq dealers. The b-
coefficient indicates that a one percent increase in ECN market share 
lowers the average quoted spread by .6%. Weston argues that these 
results are particularly strong because the data used actually give an 
underestimation of the true impact due to the manner in which
volumes are reported to Nasdaq. Note, however, that they are only
valid for small trades, not for block trades. Thus, in addition to regula-
tory market reforms, the growth of ECNs has helped to significantly 
lower trading costs. As such, it has mitigated the negative effects of 
the suspected imperfect competition among Nasdaq dealers(e.g. 
Huang and Stoll (996), Christie and Schultz (994), Weston (2002))0.
Domowitz (200) constructs an American sample by gathering data 
from institutional investors. For this dataset, total trading costs for 
executions by institutional investors through ECNs and through tra-
ditional brokers and markets are compared. Calculated yearly savings 
from 993 through 996 using automated systems vary from 3 to 6 
percent, relative to trades executed by traditional brokers or dealers. 
Domowitz also manages to invalidate the conventional wisdom that 
automated trading venues are cheaper only because “easier” trades 
are more often sent to them as he proves that even for more difficult
trades, savings from automated execution are evident2.
 
0  This is supposed to be due to practices such as payment for order flow and preferenced 
trading used by traditional dealers to attract order flow through non-price competition. 
Thus, large spreads are prevented from being competed away (Weston (2000)).
  Average savings amount to 46 percent.
2  Domowitz defines more difficult trades as having above median values of trade size 
and volatility, or having below average market capitalization (firm size), i.e. the controls 
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This empirical evidence is also consistent with Conrad, Johnson and 
Wahal (2003), although they use a somewhat different approach. They 
determine what the difference in realized execution costs is between 
crossing networks (POSIT or an after-hours cross on Instinet), ECNs 
(Instinet) and traditional markets (NYSE, Amex or Nasdaq). These 
three trading systems are engaged in a competition for order flow. In 
their dataset3, the distinction is made between single and multiple 
mechanism orders, which are respectively orders that are completely
executed by a single trading system (9 percent of all orders) and 
those in which trades are filled by more than one trading system 
(9 percent of all orders). Note that there is considerable time series 
variation, but no trend in the distribution of single mechanism orders.
Further, the data show substantial differences in size between orders 
executed on the three mechanisms. Order fill rates are lowest for 
crossing systems as it concerns a mere function of liquidity on the 
system (cfr. contra-side depth), which is exogenous to the trader. As 
traders on ECNs and on traditional broker systems can trade anony-
mously, they endogenously increase the probability of a fill. Evidently, 
multiple mechanism orders have the largest execution costs, as they 
are most difficult to fill. 
As in Domowitz (200), total execution costs are measured as the sum 
of implicit and explicit costs. Obviously, comparing execution costs 
between different trading systems univariately can be quite misleading 
as the trading mechanisms may represent varying degrees of aggres-
siveness on the part of the institution4. One needs to take the differ-
ences in order characteristics between these systems into account. 
For instance, variation in order difficulty and other characteristics 
influence liquidity and thus trading costs. These are controlled for
3  Note that only to describe ECN activity, only data for Instinet were used as the remain-
ing ECNs only commenced operations after the end of their sample period.
4  Conrad et al. (2003) offer the following ranking on aggressiveness: external crosses < 
ECN-executions < broker-dealer operations. These differences result in a natural sorting 
of order difficulty across the categories.26 Tilburg University
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using two methods, i.e. a “matched-sample” approach and a regres-
sion-based approach6 as in Weston7. Both these methods yield quite 
similar results. Compared to traditional brokers, execution costs on 
crossing systems are substantially lower. For ECNs, this cost advantage 
is even more pronounced. Note that these results are quite robust and 
that the differences can be primarily attributed to distinct implicit costs. 
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) note, however, that an endogene-
ity problem may arise as the choice of trading mechanism could be 
endogenous to (ex post) realized execution costs. More difficult-to-fill 
orders that incur higher ex-post execution costs are more likely to be 
sent to mechanisms guaranteeing a high fill rate. This issue, which 
leads to inconsistent estimates, is not accounted for in the above 
mentioned methods and therefore needs to be addressed by using a 
two-stage procedure (“endogenous switching regression method”) 
following Madhavan and Cheng (997). The cost differentials described 
above seem to persist when applying this model, in fact they are even 
more pronounced. 
Weston (2002) also investigates whether the increase in ECN market 
share leads to greater depths. For this purpose, he performs the 
following regression:
Depthit = a0 + a ECNactivityit + a2 In(volume)it + a3 In(Price)it + a4In(volatility)it
+a In(MarketConcentration)it + a6(TimeDummy)t + e it
The presence of an ECN does seem to increase the quoted depth.
  Which controls for trade direction, order instruction, order size, exchange listing and 
market capitalization without imposing any functional form restrictions.
6  Control variables:  order size, inverse of stock price, logarithm of market capitalization, 
exchange listing, return volatility, cumulative size-decile adjusted return, institution-
specific indicator variables, indicator variables for external crosses and ECN-executed 
orders.
7  Note that another possibility for comparing execution costs is focusing on multiple 
mechanism orders, as order characteristics by definition are held constant across the 
trades. Also the investor chooses how to break up the order, and where and in what 
sequence to place the order. 
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Weston’s results suggest that a % increase in ECNactivity increases 
depths by .%. These conclusions, however, are disputed by Barclay, 
Hendershott and McCormick (2003) who study transactions data for 
June 2000 and conclude that ECN trading lowers quoted depths. 
Weston (2000) investigates informational efficiency and suggests that 
ECNs do impose higher adverse selection costs on traditional markets 
through more anonymous trading8. An increase in anonymity through 
ECN trading may therefore increase information costs, urging inter-
mediaries to charge larger spreads (Amihud and Mendelson (986), 
Glosten and Harris (988)). So, although ECNs lower trading costs, 
they reduce the informational efficiency of prices. Note that this 
conjecture does not hold if the ECN functions as a separate market.
In this case the presence of an ECN reduces the amount of informa-
tion asymmetry in a dealer market by providing an alternative venue 
for information-based trades. Weston performs a test on the change 
in anonymity of trading on the Nasdaq due to ECN trading, i.e. esti-
mating the adverse selection component of spread (Huang and Stoll 
(996)) and regressing this measure on the level of ECN activity and 
a group of control variables9. An increase in adverse selection costs 
linked to ECN trading is noticed, confirming the first conjecture stated 
above. However, these costs are outweighed by benefit of lower over-
all transaction costs. 
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) describe the link between the 
efficiency of the base markets’ price discovery mechanism and the suc-
cess of ECNs. For the United States, it has been extensively proven 
that transaction costs are significantly lower on the NYSE than on 
Nasdaq (for ex. Hasbrouck (99), Huang and Stoll (996)). An obvious 
rationale for this difference is the distinction in trading mechanisms 
that are employed on both markets, i.e. auction markets provide more 
adequate price discovery than the dealership markets.
8  Intermediaries face uncertainty on the type of trader they deal with, i.e. informed or 
uninformed ones.
9  These control variables include market capitalization, share turnover, return volatility 
and market concentration, and are also suspected to affect information costs.28 Tilburg University
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In their study, they refer to Hendershott and Mendelson (2000), who 
state two necessary conditions for crossing systems to be successful 
when co-existing with a dealer market. Firstly, as these systems do 
not provide active price discovery themselves, they need to rely on a 
primary market providing an adequate price discovery mechanism. 
Secondly, the crossing network initially needs to attract at least a min-
imum threshold of volume from this primary market so that the pool 
of liquidity is sufficiently large20. Based on these conditions, one could 
postulate that crossing networks will be more successful in compet-
ing for NYSE shares and therefore primarily focus on listed securities. 
ECNs on the other hand, engage themselves in active price discovery, 
and will therefore rather compete with primary markets with higher
transaction costs and fragmented order flow. In fact, their success is
inversely related to the efficiency of the primary market, i.e. if bid-ask 
spreads are higher on the primary market, ECNs become a truly com-
petitive alternative. Clearly, external crossing systems and ECNs com-
pete for order flow in different dimensions as certain clientele effects 
arise. Empirical evidence seems to support both these conjectures 
as 90 percent of all orders executed on external crossing systems are 
for NYSE securities and 80 percent of all ECN-executed orders are for 
Nasdaq securities (sample by Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003)). 
IV.1.2  Crossing Networks and traditional markets
The empirical literature analyzing CNs contains only a few studies. 
The main reason is that these proprietary systems often do not reveal 
detailed information. In this section, we summarize the results of five 
empirical studies we are aware of. We also present a practitioner’s 
view on CNs.
Gresse (2006) studies the impact of the POSIT CN on the liquidity of 
the dealer market segment of the London Stock Exchange (SEAQ) for 
20  Referring to the Hendershott and Mendelson paper, Conrad et al. quote that “Volume 
on crossing systems that provide no price discovery function has a natural upper bound 
since the system cannot exist independent of the primary price-setting mechanism, 
whether it be an auction or dealer market. To the extent that other systems (such as 
ECNs) provide a price discovery mechanism, they can exist and grow independently.”29 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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two 6-months periods during 200 for a cross-section of UK and Irish 
mid-cap stocks. She finds that POSIT has a market share of total trad-
ing volume in these stocks of about one to two percent. Its probability 
of execution, though, is still low (2-4%). Furthermore, she reports that 
activity at POSIT does not have a detrimental effect on liquidity in the 
considered DM: there is no significant increase in adverse selection 
or inventory risk on the DM. Hence, empirically, no dominating nega-
tive fragmentation effect is detected. Instead, spreads decrease due to 
increased competition and to risk sharing.
Conrad, Johnson and Wahal (2003) use proprietary data for a total of 
$.6 trillion in equity trades from 996: to 998: by 9 institutional 
investors in the U.S. who are able to choose between three trading 
platforms: CNs, Electronic Communication Networks and traditional 
brokers. They distinguish orders that are entirely filled by one trading
system (single-mechanism orders) and orders that use more than one 
trading system (multiple-mechanism orders). While controlling for 
variation in order and security characteristics as well as for endogene-
ity in the choice of trading venue, they find that crosses have substan-
tially lower realized execution costs as compared to brokers (the aver-
age cost differential ranges from 4 to 30 basis points). Most of these 
economically significant differences could be attributed to the lower 
commissions on CNs, but more importantly also to the absence of 
spread costs and direct price impact costs. However, the cost differ-
ential is expected to decrease in the future, due to additional competi-
tion. For the multiple-mechanism orders, they indeed find that most 
traders opt for brokers as last method of execution (“market of last 
resort” as in Hendershott and Mendelson (2000)).
Næs and Ødegaard (2006) examine the trades of a single institution, 
the Norwegian Petroleum Fund for a 6-month period: 4200 orders 
that are sent first to CNs and, in case of non-execution, subsequently 
to brokers (i.e. an opportunistic trading strategy). Their results show 
that although the Conrad et al. (2003) cost differential is confirmed, 
it is not clear that this differential persists if the presence of private 
information (which may affect the probability of crossing) is account-
ed for. Hence, measured low costs in CNs may be fully offset by sub-30 Tilburg University
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stantial costs of non-trading due to adverse selection in the CNs.
Næs and Skjeltorp (2003) extend this analysis using the same data 
set. They investigate the nature of competition between a principal 
exchange and a CN with respect to the primary market’s liquidity. 
Past empirical evidence shows that CNs primarily compete in the 
most liquid stocks. Næs and Skjeltorp argue that if stocks that are 
not supplied in CNs are less liquid in general, then these stocks need 
a higher return to induce investors to hold them. Consequently, the 
abnormal performance of the non-crossed stocks found in Næs and 
Ødegaard (2006) may be explained by a liquidity premium. They find 
significant differences in liquidity between stocks that are traded on 
CNs and stocks that have to be bought in the market. This potentially 
indicates the presence of informed trading in the non-executed CN 
stocks. However, they also find that there are systematic differences 
in liquidity between the two groups of stocks on other dates than the 
trading dates of the actual crossing strategy, suggesting that there 
are systematic differences in the characteristics of the two groups of 
stocks that are unrelated to private information.
Fong, Madhavan and Swan (2004) focus on the price impact of block 
trades on different trading venues, i.e. a limit order book, a CN and 
an upstairs market for data from the Australian Stock Exchange. 
They find that competition from the two latter markets imposes no 
adverse effect on the liquidity of the limit order book. Hence, there 
is no evidence of a liquidity drain from the downstairs market. CNs 
and upstairs markets are even shown to be beneficial. Moreover, 
they argue that the migration of trades to the upstairs market is not 
responsible for the high asymmetric information problems in down-
stairs markets. As compared to Gresse (2006), they argue that this 
benefit is caused by an improvement of counterparty search, rather 
than by the cream-skimming of informed traders or by the risk-sharing 
explanations.
We start the discussion on the practitioner’s view by providing some 
recent market shares of the different CNs. Employing a broad CN def-
inition, by including Liquidnet, Sussman (200a) estimates the market 3 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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share of the CN business in the US for the second quarter of 200. 
With a share of 47%, Liquidnet outranks POSIT (3%).2 Instinet 
follows both market leaders at a reasonable distance with a share of 
0%. Other smaller systems account for the remaining 8%. According 
to Tabb (2004) reporting on institutional equity trading in America, 
about 90% of all large investment management firms state using a 
CN.22 Within the medium or small segment of firms, this rate is 
somewhat lower, 86% and 60% respectively. In the next couple of
years, these numbers, as well as the intensity of usage, are still 
expected to increase as order flow keeps on migrating toward these 
cheaper venues. The two main stated reasons for using CNs are first 
the ability to find pooled sources of liquidity and second to anony-
mously execute large blocks while limiting market impact and
information leakage.23 In fact, this partly explains the lower popularity 
among small firms, as they on average have smaller positions to trade. 
Hence, they care less about potential market impact or information 
leakages and are able to use the traditional markets more effectively. 
In contrast, large institutional investors strive to hide their liquidity to 
avoid these undesirable outcomes. While CNs are eager to comply with 
this crave for anonymity by lowering their transparency level, it also 
causes market fragmentation. This shows that transparency and critical 
mass are also mentioned as concerns by practitioners. 
2  Note that it is the first time Liquidnet’s volume outgrows that of POSIT.
22  The sample they used was constructed on the basis of conversations with 2 head and 
senior traders of investment management firms and hedge funds. The large group, 
0 in total, represents those firms in the sample with an Assets Under Management 
(AUM) over US $0 billion.
23  For instance, the average trade size in the traditional U.S. markets (NYSE, NASDAQ, 
NSX and ArcaEx) early 2004 was approximately 00 shares, while Liquidnet’s average 
trade size in the same period approximately equaled 47,000 shares. Hence, filling a 
large block order takes longer on the traditional markets as it requires more transac-
tions and is more likely to induce adverse market impact.  Note that the number for the 
traditional markets used to be higher (e.g. more than 400 shares in 997), but experi-
enced a significant (liquidity) decrease due to the introduction of Order Handling Rules 
in 997 mandating the development of electronic execution and the implementation of 
a decimalized price grid in 2000 which fragments liquidity across price points.32 Tilburg University
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In particular, the main disadvantages of using CNs are stated to be (i) 
the low liquidity level due to the current low fill rates which results in a 
high opportunity cost24, (ii) the lack of ex-post market data provision, 
and (iii) the low transparency level. These factors still impede their 
widespread usage and prevent CNs from attaining critical mass. To 
increase their fill rates, most CNs are currently adapting their market 
design. POSIT and Pipeline Trading (a block-trading alternative which 
only started early 200) are trying to capture liquidity from broker-
dealers at the sell side.2 In reaction, Liquidnet focuses on bringing in 
retail-size order flow to match against the existing wholesale liquidity 
pool by implementing a new initiative “Liquidnet H2O”. Thus, it tries 
to bring together two pools of liquidity, institutional and retail, while 
still remaining faithful to its buy-side only strategy.
IV.2.   Market access
The MiFID, in line with the ISD, establishes a EU-passport for invest-
ment firms. Member States have to ensure that investment firms 
authorised from other member states have the right to access () the 
regulated markets in their country, and (2) the clearing and settlement 
systems. MiFID also imposes best-execution obligations to investment 
firms. For professional clients, an investment firm is free to define in 
its execution policy what factors it will take into account. For retail 
clients, investment firms are required to deliver the best possible 
result in terms of price and costs; a regulation closely in line with the 
trade-through rule in the US. The economic rationale for trade-through 
prohibition is that this would discourage liquidity provision
. 
24  A joint study by Plexus Group and Financial Insights indicated this opportunity cost (i.e. 
the cost of delayed or even failed execution due to for instance an adverse price move-
ment) by far exceeds the other implicit and explicit costs of trade execution, which is a 
confirmation of the Næs and Ødegaard (2006) results.
2   More specifically, POSIT enhances its system to capture new features that address 
criticisms of Liquidnet with the introduction of “POSIT Now” (formerly TriAct, a con-
tinuous CN similar to Liquidnet) and “POSIT Alert” (which alerts the client of trading 
opportunities before they are visible in the market, i.e. matching of signals on desired 
trades), beside the existing  “POSIT match” (which trades at set intervals).33 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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Important in this respect is also whether investors have equal market
access, and how smart order routing technology may bring markets 
together by providing technology that optimally executes orders on 
several markets. Foucault and Menkveld (2006) study a theoreti-
cal model where two exchanges compete and where only a fraction 
of brokers implements SORT to fulfil the trade-through rules. Their 
model shows that joint depths will increase since submitting orders to 
another exchange somehow allows overcoming time priority. Also the 
presence of more smart routers leads to more liquidity at the entrant 
market. They bring their model to the data by analyzing Dutch stocks 
with the introduction of EuroSETS next to Euronext Amsterdam. They 
find that joint depth has increased after the introduction of EuroSETS. 
They also find that bid-ask spreads are lower on EuroSETs for stocks
exhibiting more smart routers. Market access to new trading platforms 
induced by smart routers seems a key input for success.
IV.3.   Transparency
The degree of transparency on financial markets influences trad-
ers’ submission strategies. Greater transparency has the tendency 
to equalize information across market participants. A distinction is 
made between pre-trade transparency and post-trade transparency. 
Pre-trade transparency refers to the availability of information on out-
standing order flow accumulated in the order book or dealer’s quotes 
before orders are submitted. This information is about quotes and 
trading interest, and can contain information on different trading plat-
forms. Post-trade transparency deals with the availability of informa-
tion about executed trades.
Stock exchanges differ to a great extent on the transparency degree of 
their financial markets. The MiFID in Europe also regulates what infor-
mation should be disclosed to market participants for stocks that are 
listed on regulated markets. In particular, MiFID requires that for the 
“multilateral trading facilities” and the “regulated markets”, real time 
interests are made available to investors. For quote driven markets, 
this is the best bid and offer of every market maker, while for order 
driven markets these are the five best bids and offers. Also systematic 
internalisers need to provide quotes to market participants for the 34 Tilburg University
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most liquid stocks. Post-trade information needs to be submitted real 
time and contain the time stamp, the instrument traded, the price, 
the quantity and the execution venue.26
Pagano and Roëll (996) have shown that pre-trade transparency is an 
important determinant of the competitiveness of a financial market. 
They find that, when considering a single trading system, greater 
transparency typically generates lower average trading costs for unin-
formed traders (see also Baruch (200)). The revelation of traders’ 
identities, however, may induce opposite effects (see Foucault et al. 
(2006), or Rindi (2003)). Also, transparency of the limit order book 
implies that limit orders may become free options, such that the 
willingness to submit limit orders may decrease. Bloomfield and 
O’Hara (2000) show that in a dynamic trading environment, transpar-
ency has ambiguous consequences. When markets are opaque, only 
the liquidity supplier gets informed. Therefore, competition is harsh 
initially but comes at the cost of lower liquidity later on, as non-
informed liquidity suppliers now face a “double” adverse selection
from both the informed trader and the informed liquidity supplier.  
Post-trade transparency of large trades may make it difficult for market 
makers to unwind their inventories. Naik et al. (999), however, argue 
that post-trade transparency may be beneficial for market makers even 
when trading with informed traders. The intuition is that, when large 
trades are disclosed, this new information is immediately revealed in 
the market, enhancing risk-sharing possibilities of market makers. 
  
But how does transparency affect intermarket competition? In con-
trast to ECNs which basically function as a transparent limit order 
book, CNs are in practice extremely opaque trading systems, both in 
terms of pre-trade and post-trade transparency. Pre-trade transparency 
on one market allows for “free-riding” behavior of other markets and 
by crossing networks in particular (Hendershott and Mendelson 
(2000)). Degryse, Van Achter and Wuyts (2006) show that the degree 
of opaqueness determines traders’ willingness to opt for the CN. 
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They highlight the first point of the following trade-off. On the one 
hand, a pre-trade transparent CN invites traders to hit visible market 
liquidity. Also, investors may be more willing to opt for the CN as they 
anticipate their order will invite counterparties to benefit from the 
created and visible liquidity. On the other hand, opaque CN systems 
allow for trading anonymously. Large order imbalances in the CN then 
do not alarm the base market and do not generate an adverse price 
impact. 
There are only a few empirical studies that investigate the impact of 
transparency changes. A first paper finds negative market-quality 
effects of more pre-trade transparency. Madhavan et al (200) study 
the dissemination on the Toronto Stock Exchange of Limit Order book 
data on April 2, 990. At that date, the stock exchange started to 
display limit order book data on the “floor” trading segment and the 
“automatic trading segment” (CATS). They find a negative impact on 
market quality. The bid-ask spreads increase on the Toronto Stock 
Exchange; however, more so for “floor trading” than for “CATS”. Also 
the adverse selection component of the bid-ask spread increases in 
both “floor” and “CATS” stocks. While depth remains unaffected, there 
is a significant increase in volatility. Finally, Madhavan et al (200)report 
a negative stock market reaction as there was a decline in stock prices. 
Other papers have found a positive impact of pre-trade transparency 
on market quality. Boehmer, Saar and Yu (200) study the introduc-
tion of the OpenBook on the NYSE of January 2002. This greater 
transparency implies that traders off the NYSE floor observe depth in 
the limit order book in real time at each price level. Boehmer, Saar 
and Yu (200) find that this has an impact on trading strategies in 
that traders seem to manage the exposure of their orders (higher 
cancellation rates and shorter time-to-cancellation) and that the spe-
cialist” participation declines. The informational efficiency of prices 
increases as there are smaller deviations of transaction prices from 
the efficient price. Finally, liquidity increases as effective spreads 
decline and limit order book depth augments.
One paper looks at the impact a pre-trade transparency change in one 36 Tilburg University
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market has on other markets. In particular, Hendershott and Jones 
(200) study the situation where Island decided to remove the display 
of the limit order book and “to go dark” in the three most-active 
Exchange Traded Funds on September 23, 2002, to avoid the 
Regulation ATS. This regulation implied that when limit order book 
data are made available to some players, it had to be made available 
to all interested parties. Island was at that time the most important 
trading venue in these instruments. The impact of Island going dark 
was a drop of its market share of about half, and price discovery 
shifting to other markets (Instinet, Archipelago, AMEX, NYSE). The 
effective and realized spreads increased on Island and decreased on 
the other markets, with the net overall effect being ambiguous. On 
October 3, 2003, Island decided to redisplay the quotes. Spreads fell 
but not back to their original level.
Gemmill (996) investigates changes in post-trade transparency on 
the London Stock Exchange. He studies the liquidity for three differ-
ent publication regimes. From 987 to 988, dealers had to immedi-
ately report their block trades, while from 99 to 992 they had to do 
so within 90 minutes, and from 989 to 990 they had 24 hours to do 
so. The disclosure regime seems not to affect liquidity on the London 
Stock Exchange.
V.    Policy Discussion and Concluding Remarks: What  
    to expect from MiFID?
In this paper, we reviewed the theoretical arguments and empirical 
evidence for stock markets related to intermarket competition, market 
access and transparency. The empirical evidence, mainly stemming 
from the US, shows that, in general, the competition effect of coexist-
ing financial trading systems seems to dominate the fragmentation 
effect. That is market quality (i.e. bid-ask spreads, depth, informa-
tional efficiency and price discovery) improves when financial markets 
coexist. This result is particularly strong for competition between 
ECNs and dealer markets like Nasdaq; however, it is less strong for 
competition between CNs and other trading system. To the extent 
that the empirical results can be applied for Europe, we can expect 
that competition from new trading platforms will, to say the least, not 37 Competition on Financial Markets: Does Market Design Matter?
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be harmful in terms of market quality or investor protection. However, 
most continental European financial markets as well as the most liq-
uid segment on the LSE (SETS) already exhibit an auction market 
design employing a limit order book. Competition from alternative 
trading systems with the NYSE, which also employs a limit order book, 
has not been so successful since the “trade-through rule” applies, 
implying that orders need to go to the most liquid market. Since 
MiFID imposes a best-execution rule, this might suggest that new 
trading platforms in Europe have a lower probability of success. Also, 
one needs to be concerned about the empirical evidence in that this 
positive effect of fragmentation might simply reflect a sample selec-
tion bias: fragmentation is only observed when it improves liquidity. 
Moreover, some recent attempts, like Virt-X, have not been very suc-
cessful in competing with established markets.
A new trading platform or alternative trading system will only attract 
a considerable market share and become liquid when it is able to () 
move liquidity from the existing regulated markets to the new trading 
platform, and/or (2) serve new groups of customers by offering an 
alternative market design. On November 4, 2006, seven large banks 
– Citigroup, Credit Suisse, Deutsche Bank, Goldman Sachs, Merrill 
Lynch, Morgan Stanley and UBS – announced that they will create a 
new trading platform spanning Europe, and will ask other banks to 
join. These seven large banks cover about half of all trades in Europe. 
To the extent that this trading platform can create liquidity, and finan-
cial institutions can interpret the best-execution rules such that they 
can execute their investors’ order flow on the new trading platform 
(see also below), they seem to be able to fulfill condition () above. If 
this were to happen, this new trading platform can become a serious 
competitor for Euronext, Deutsche Börse, the London Stock Exchange 
as well as other European exchanges. However, switches from liquidi-
ty in one market to another market have been scarce (see however the 
switch in liquidity from Liffe to Eurex in the German Bund in 998 – 
also called in the Industrial Organization literature “Market Tipping”). 
At the time of writing this piece, no details are available concerning 
the design of the trading platform, and an answer on whether condi-
tion (2) of above holds can not be provided.38 Tilburg University
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European exchanges react to the new MiFID regulation and new com-
petitive threats in a number of ways. A first reaction is by mergers 
and acquisitions among themselves.27 The demutualization of stock 
exchanges and their public listing allows exchanges to merge more 
easily. Almost all possible combinations between exchanges have 
been on the radar screen but mergers between Euronext-NYSE and 
the LSE-Nasdaq seem to have the highest chance of success (at least 
at the time of writing this piece), in line with predictions in Degryse
and Van Achter (200). The two major markets in the US also have 
reacted to the competitive threats of alternative trading systems by 
mergers and acquisitions. Nasdaq acquired two major competing
ECNs (Brass Utility in September 2004 and Reuter’s Instinet in 
December 200), and is trying to acquire the London Stock Exchange. 
The NYSE acquired Archipelago and aims to merge with Euronext. 
A second reaction by the incumbent exchanges is to “preempt” the 
market by changing their market design to cater to different types of 
traders, i.e. by product proliferation. Recent history has shown that 
the incumbent markets have been able to survive competitors (see 
e.g. SEAQ-International at the end of the 980s, EuroSETS for Dutch 
stocks). Many exchanges in Europe and the US offer a full range 
of different trading platforms and have become hybrid markets. 
For example, both the NYSE and Nasdaq have installed Crossing 
Networks. An open question in the market-microstructure literature 
is how the policy recommendations would differ when comparing 
competition between several markets with different trading systems 
versus one exchange that offers multiple trading systems. A third 
strategic reaction is to lower trading fees. For example, Euronext’s 
reaction to the announced plans of the seven large banks as well as 
other entrants could be to lower fees, in order to predate entrants. 
This is exactly what happened when London’s EuroSETS was created: 
Euronext responded by lowering the fees. Competition authorities and 
financial supervisors and regulators should follow closely this behavior 
as a lowering of fees might reflect predatory pricing (see for example 
the EU-investigation of Euronext’s lowering trading fees for Dutch 
securities). A countervailing force, however, is that most incumbent 
27   See Engelen (2007) for a complete description of the changes in the securities trading 
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markets are now publicly listed themselves: shareholders put pressure 
on exchanges not to lower fees too much. This contrasts with the 
prelisted environment where the member firms typically were also the 
most important shareholder of the exchanges. Davis et al (200) have 
argued that the countries where the concentration rule applied (e.g. 
France, Italy, and Spain) will be most affected by MiFID.
The day-to-day interpretation of the best-execution rule will be impor-
tant for the potential of new trading platforms (see also Gomber and 
Gsell (2007)). MiFID requires investment firms to specify an order 
execution policy that includes “information on the different venues 
where the investment firm executes its client orders and the fac-
tors affecting the choice of execution venue (op cit European Union 
(2004), Article 2 (3)). Moreover, investment firms do not need to 
connect to every trading venue at any cost. Gomber and Gsell (2007) 
mention two possible interpretations of the best-execution rule. The 
first is “best execution as a process”, implying that orders are routed 
to the cheapest execution venue on a consistent basis. Investment 
firms can then exclude certain trading platforms and specify a limited 
set of trading venues in their execution policy. The second interpreta-
tion is on an order-by-order basis. Foucault and Menkveld (2006) 
show that market access is important to give incentives to liquidity 
suppliers. A strict (absolute) interpretation of the best-execution rule 
combined with full transparency and market access introduces two 
opposing forces. On the one hand, such a combination gives incum-
bent markets an important liquidity advantage as orders need to go to 
the most liquid market. On the other hand, as Foucault and Menkveld 
(2006) argue, a new trading system gives investors the opportunity 
to jump time-priority by submitting orders to the new trading system 
and becoming first in the queue. This might improve overall liquidity 
of markets. 
The empirical results on transparency were not clear-cut. Earlier stud-
ies show negative effects of greater transparency whereas the most 
recent evidence suggests that greater transparency promotes liquidity. 
One explanation for the diverging results might be the greater avail-
ability of technology. The current technology allows investors the pos-40 Tilburg University
January 19, 2007
sibility to monitor the limit order book closely. As argued by Davis et 
al (200), the impact of greater transparency might be most at work 
in the UK and Germany. We expect that greater transparency will 
improve market quality. However the results will need to be closely 
monitored by regulators and supervisors (see also Davis et al. (200)).
We conclude the discussion by making two additional points. First, 
US evidence shows that the regulation that requires the publication 
of execution market quality affects order routing. The SEC requires 
market centers to publish monthly market quality reports. Boehmer, 
Jennings and Wei (200) find that the sensitivity of market share to 
execution quality increased after this regulation. European supervisors 
and regulators might want to follow this example. Second, Shkilko, 
Van Ness and Van Ness (2006) show that, for the US, the National 
Best Bid and Offer for an average active stock is non-positive 0.8% 
and 4.0% of the time on, respectively, the Nasdaq and the NYSE 
inter-markets. They attribute these non-positive spreads to competi-
tive trading practices in contemporary fragmented markets. When 
European financial markets become more fragmented due to the crea-
tion of new trading facilities and internalisers, similar situations might 
occur. This will confront academics, practitioners, investors, as well as 
supervisors with new issues. Examples are, how to define best execu-
tion; how to detect anti-competitive behavior, how to detect insider 
trading? It should be clear from this lecture that supervisors, regula-
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